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LENORE

In his tribute to the late Professor Edmond Cahn, which opened the
memorial edition of the New York University Law Review, Justice
Hugo Black took a text from Cahn's first book, The Sense of Injustice.
Wrote Black:
"Here was a man-a lawyer-who was not ashamed to endorse the
idea that 'justice or righteousness is the source, the substance, and the
ultimate end of law,' and that a legal concept is most worthwhile when
it 'becomes relevant to the homely experiences of individual human
beings.' This was to me a pleasing contrast to the idea expressed by
many that 'courts do not sit to administer justice, but to administer
the law,' as though there is a kind of hostility between the two." 1
Edmond Cahn's precept concerning justice and injustice was carried forward in his second book, The Moral Decision, and in his last
published work, The Predicament of Democratic Man, the concept
was broadened to take in the entire society. It is by no means surprising
that at the moment of his untimely death, in 1964, he was writing a
book with the assigned title, The Meaning of Justice. It is consequently
wholly fitting that "The Edmond Cahn Reader," drawn together from
many sources and posthumously published in 1966, should be entitled
Confronting Injustice.
Thanks to this concentration of thought upon the meaning of
justice, during the twenty years after he ceased to be a tax lawyer to
become legal philosopher, the close-to-forty articles here assembled
from legal and other magazines, public addresses and correspondence,
have a truly remarkable consistency and cohesion. It is almost as if he
had completed the book whose two written chapters tragically terminate the present volume. The style is clear, lucid and charming, giving
no hint of the heavy labors Cahn is said to have bestowed upon his
writing.
Credit for selection of the contents of this book belongs to Lenore
Cahn, who played an active role in the development of her husband's
ideas and ideals. The introduction and illuminating headnotes are
from the pen of Norman Redlich, former student and faculty associate
of Professor Cahn, and at present executive assistant corporation counsel of the City of New York. His contribution combines deserved
eulogy with exposition of Cahn's ideas and purposes and has a clarifying and unifying effect.
The basic unity, however, is in Cahn's thought. It is significant that
1 Black, About Edmond Cahn, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 207 (1965).
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the opening and near-closing articles of Confronting Injustice have
closely-related titles, "The Consumers of Injustice" and "The Shift to
a Consumer Perspective." The first is a reprint of Cahn's Horace M.
Kallen Lecture of 1959 at the New School for Social Research; the
last presents the fundamental idea of the book whose production was
precluded by his death. In both he was dealing with a new and truly
American factor in law and politics-the shift of perspective from legal
concepts held in monarchies, oligarchies and aristocracies to the power
and responsibility of the citizen in a representative democracy. The
old perspective was that of the ruler or the government official; the
new perspective is that of "the democratic citizen in the role of consumer of the law." 2 Not that this shift is fully achieved in American
jurisprudencel
Injustice persists, in Cahn's estimation, because the old imperial
perspective continues to dominate legislatures and courts through
tradition, ignorance and the self-interest of its beneficiaries. "The
ugliest sign of our thralldom to the old outlook is that it tends to
desensitize men of fine intellect and good will."3 They learn somehow
not to notice what happens to individuals, and suppress their own inevitable involvement in the ills of the victims. Such men beguile themselves with a rule of averages. The "third degree" and such horrors are
not used (or at least exposed) frequently, so on balance all is well. Even
Justice Cardozo, rightly "regarded as a paragon of moral insight,"4
wrote in his most celebrated book that "the eccentricities of judges
balance one another," causing a little confusion until, happily, "The
future takes care of such things." 5
"Revere Cardozo as we may," comments Edmond Cahn, "we cannot
help retorting that averages in the administration of justice do not
avail the person who is wronged grievously in his own, particular
case." 6 Official misconduct, seen, heard or read about, arouses the
sense of injustice, stirring the sympathetic reaction of outrage, resentment, and anger, "for our physiology has equipped us to regard an act
'
of injustice to another as a personal aggression against ourselves. T
Is that all? Clearly not, adds Cahn. "While the sense of injustice
uses empathy, projection, and emotion, it simultaneously summons
perception, reasoning, intelligence, and judgment-all the capacities
2 E. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE 6 (L. Cahn ed. 1966).
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that make for understanding and the application of sense. ' 8 The
author, using the method he employed so strikingly in The Moral Decision, goes to the courts to trace the transition that has taken place in
the last forty years, in reaction, for example, against the excesses of the
prosecution and the callousness of judges in the case of Tom Mooney.
Cahn's keen perceptions govern the several chapters devoted to the
Bill of Rights, especially to freedom of religion and the press. The
title of one of them, "The Firstness of the First Amendment," furnishes a sufficient indication of this emphasis. The touchstone is James
Madison's prophecy in 1789 that if these rights are implanted in the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice "will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive." 9 Actually, the rights thus implanted have been frustrated,
followed by a belated movement of fulfillment in the judicial opinions
of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, Hughes, Black, Douglas,
Murphy, Rutledge, Brennan, Warren and others who have made up
occasional and precarious majorities.
Like an interlude from the Middle Ages is a chapter comprised of
1962 correspondence on freedom of the press between Professor Cahn
and David Ben-Gurion, then Prime Minister of Israel. Cahn wrote to
protest against a proposed Israeli law that would enable the government to shut down any newspaper found guilty of publishing two
libels in the course of two years. Almost any reflection on a public
person, the nation, or the people in general was to be considered libelous. Ben-Gurion stuck to his guns, defending the doctrine of "prior
restraint" just as it was defended by Archbishop Whitgift and Star
Chamber judges in Elizabethan England. He then drew the same
distinction between "freedom" and "licentiousness" of the press that
was drawn by Blackstone in 1769 and by the framers of the American
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. In one of his replies Cahn assailed
the concept of "group libel" as something that precluded the defense
of truth or reasonable basis of belief-an argument that he could have
directed equally against the United States Supreme Court for its decision in Chicago's Beauharnaiscase.
In his exchange with Ben-Gurion, Cahn carefully limited the issue
to restraint previous to publication. He was not talking about punishment of published libels. That same tactic was followed by English
libertarians in the eighteenth century, when they concentrated on reform of the libel law instead of advocating complete freedom of opin8 Id. at 13.
9 Id. at 90.
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ion. That has been taken by modern defenders of seditious libel laws
as an indication that Englishmen, and inferentially the sponsors of
the first amendment, accepted the punishment of published utterances.
But Cahn elsewhere rejects that utterly-just as English libertarians
would have done if they had discerned the remotest chance of success.
Cahn's commitment to absolute freedom of expression put him on
the side of Justices Black and Douglas and against the "balancing
doctrine" of Justice Felix Frankfurter. The latter construed the words
of the first amendment, "Congress shall make no law" restricting the
freedom of religion, speech, press, or assembly, to mean that Congress
shall make no such law unless there is sufficient reason for doing so. But
Cahn took note of overlapping inconsistencies on both sides. Black and
Douglas grade the first eight amendments, making the first pre-eminent.
But they put them all on a par in judging the weight of the fourteenth
amendment upon them. Frankfurter grades them with respect to inclusion under the fourteenth amendment, excluding some from its
force, but he puts them on a par in relation to their intrinsic force and
importance. Cahn clarifies these inconsistencies in terms of constitutional realities. Judged by their fruits, "the composite doctrines of
Justices Black and Douglas are designed consistently to promote the
constitutional guarantees, and the composite doctrines of Justice
Frankfurter are designed as consistently to subordinate, demote, or
delete them.""'
The Cahn Reader heartily approves Judge Jerome Frank's doctrine
of "fact-skepticism": a questioning of the reliability of evidence based
on the senses of sight, sound and memory. This goes to the heart of the
question of justice in the criminal courts, and is climactic on the subject
of capital punishment. On that theme the Reader reproduces Cahn's
introduction to Arthur Koestler's Reflections on Hanging. In this
preface he vividly transfers the impact of English legal atrocities to the
American scene.
Running all through Confronting Injustice is the appeal for a new
outlook in American legal education. It is written for law students,
faculties, lawyers and judges, and has in it the seeds of growth of a
modem miracle in the law.
Irving Bran
10 Id. at 303.

t Irving Brant is a noted journalist and historian.

